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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-REQUIREMENT OF CAUSAL CONNECTION BE-
TWEEN EMPLOYMENT AND INJURY-Plaintiff-employee was compensated for 
injuries received when she slipped on a patch of ice and fell on defendant-
employer's premises while going from her work to eat lunch in defendant's 
cafeteria. On appeal, held, reversed. At the time of the injury plaintiff 
was not rendering any service to her employer. There was no causal connec-
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tion between employment and injury, and the injury did not arise out of 
and in the course of her employment as required by statute. Mack v. Reo 
Motors, Inc., 345 Mich. 268, 76 N.W. (2d) 35 (1956). 
It has been assumed that the requirement in cases of this type of causal 
connection between employment and injury is a constitutional one,1 al-
though that assumption is of doubtful validity.2 Such a requirement does 
exist by statute in forty-one states because of the phrase "arising out or• in 
their workmen's compensation laws,3 for this phrase is interpreted to re-
quire a causal relation.4 To determine causal connection in so-called 
"intermission" cases where, as in the principal case, the injury occurs during 
an interval between periods of actual work, courts usually apply either an 
employer-benefit test or an incident-to-employment test.11 Under the 
former test, if the employee is performing a function of benefit to the em-
ployer at the time the injury occurs, the necessary causal relation exists and 
he will be compensated.6 Under the incident test, if, during the intermis-
sion, the employee is doing some act which could be considered one of the 
"incidents of his employment," there is enough of a causal connection to 
allow compensation.7 Some courts that have used the former test have 
taken a liberal view of benefit, and have not required that it be a direct 
one to the employer. They have found benefit when the employee was not 
doing the job for which he was employed at the time ·of the injury but was 
leaving work for lunch, 8 returning after the intermission,9 or engaging in 
recreation during the intermission.10 In the principal case, however, the 
Michigan court continued to apply a more limited concept of benefit, and 
denied recovery.11 It would be well if the Michigan court would reject 
1 Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418 (1923). 
2 O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, 340 U.S. 504' (1951). 
3 1 LARsoN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw §6.10 (1952). . 
4 Casey v. Hanson, 238 Iowa 62, 26 N.W. (2d) 50 (1947). Four states, North Dakota, 
Texas, Pennsylvania, and Washington, and the United States Employee's Compensation 
Act have dropped the "arising" phrase completely. 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 
LAw §6.10 (1952). Where this wording is absent, there is no such prerequisite to recovery. 
Lippman v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 79 N.D. 248, 55 N.W. (2d) 
453 (1952). But see Fassig v. State, 95 Ohio St. 232, 116 N.E. 104 (1917), where a causal 
connection was required even without the phrase. 
5 These tests are not used exclusively in the "intermission" cases referred to above, 
however, but are applied also to other types of compensation cases. E.g., in Olson v. 
Trinity Lodge, 226 Minn. 141, 32 N.W. (2d) 255 (1948), the incident test was used in a 
preparation for work case, and in Wamhoff v. Wagner Electric Corp., 354 Mo. 711, 190 
S.W. (2d) 915 (1945), the employer-benefit rule was used where the employee was doing 
personal work while on the job. 
6 Kern v. Southport Mill, Ltd., 174 La. 432, 141 S. 19 (1932). See Hart, "Limitation on 
Compensability: Arising out of Employment," 4 NACCA L.J. 37 (1949). 
'l Kubera's Case, 320 Mass. 419 at 420, 69 N.E. (2d) 673 (1946). 
s Clark v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., (La. App. 1946) 27 S. (2d) 464. 
9 Nagle's Case, 310 Mass. 193, 37 N.E. (2d) 474 (1941); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Smith, 91 
Ga. App. 305, 85 S.E. (2d) 484 (1954). 
l0Thomas v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 104 Kan. 432, 179 P. 372 (1919) (although 
here the court felt the benefit test was only an extension of the incident theory). 
11 The Michigan court had previously rejected the more liberal view followed in the 
cases cited nn. 8, 9, and 10 supra. Cf. Mack v. Reo Motors, Inc., 345 Mich. 268, 76 N.W. 
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such a narrow and antiquated interpretation of the workmen's compensa-
tion law, for which it has been soundly criticized,12 and adopt the incident 
rule to determine causation. It is by far the broader of the two rules, 13 and 
would undoubtedly have allowed recovery in the principal case and similar 
situations.u The incident doctrine is preferable to a broad definition of 
the benefit test, for even a liberal view of benefit may deny recovery in 
situations like the principal case.15 Admittedly, the Michigan court is 
governed by a statute requiring causal connection, and perhaps the letter 
of the act has been assiduously complied with. However, by the acceptance 
of available and recognized principles such as the incident test the court 
could also comply with its spirit. Certainly the result reached in the 
principal case is not in accord with the purpose of the workmen's compensa-
tion laws, viz., to spread the human costs of production,16 nor with the 
trend of construing the acts liberally in order that what they intend to give 
to employees will not be withheld by the courts.17 It has been said that the 
incident test has been so extended that it does away with the causal require-
ment altogether.18 This is certainly not the case, however, for the doctrine 
definitely requires a showing of some connection between the injury and 
the employment,19 and might thus be properly invoked by the Michigan 
court in applying the statute interpreted in the principal case. · 
Thomas S. Erickson, S.Ed. 
(2d) 35 (1956); Salmon v. Bagley Laundry Co., 344 Mich. 471, 74 N.W. (2d) l (1955); 
Luteran v. Ford Motor Co., 313 Mich. 487, 21 N.W. (2d) 825 (1946). 
1217 NACCA L.J. 25 (1956). 
lS "It is now well settled by the overwhelming weight of authority that all types of 
incidents, personal, habitual, contractual, ot simply reasonable under the circumstances, 
may well arise out of the employment." Horovitz, "The Litigious Phrase: 'Arising out of' 
Employment," 3 NACCA L.J. 15 at 61 (1949). 
14 Reynolds v. Oswego Falls Corp., 264 App. Div. 965, 37 N.Y.S. (2d) 167 (1942); 
Puffin v. General Electric Co., 132 Conn. 279, 43 A. (2d) 746 (1945). 
111 Cf. Gay v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co .• 72 Ga. App. 122, 33 S.E. (2d) 109 (1945). 
16 See dissent in Salmon v. Bagley Laundry Co., note 11 supra. 
17 Nicholson v. Industrial Commission. 76 Ariz. 105, 259 P. (2d) 547 (1953). 
18 Hilyard v. Lohmann-Johnson Drilling Co., 168 Kan. 177, 211 P. (2d) 89 (1949). 
Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Bruce, 249 Ala. 675, 32 S. (2d) 666 (1947). 
19 See Robertson v. Express Container Corp., 13 N.J. 342, 99 A. (2d) 649 (1953). It 
has been predicted by one writer in this field that eventually courts will not require proof 
of a causal relation. Brown, "'Arising out of and in the Course of the Employment' in 
Workmen's Compensation Laws," 8 WIS. L. REv. 217 (1933). The United States Supreme 
Court has given support to this view by holding that the test of recoyery is not a showing 
of causal relationship between employment and injury, but rather a showing that the 
obligations or conditions of employment create a zone of danger from which the injury 
arises. O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, note 2 supra. States without the causation re-
quirement have also expediently and fairly settled hard cases on the basis of the in-the-
course-of-employment test alone. Lippman v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation 
Bureau, note 4 supra; Hunter v. American Oil Co .• 136 Pa. Super. 563, 7 A. (2d) 479 
(1939). This test requires only that the injury occur within the period of employment at 
a place where the employee may reasonably be in performing his duties or activities inci-
dental thereto. It is submitted that the causation prerequisite has only confused litigation 
since its inception. See Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co .• 330 U.S. 469 (1947). It could 
well be done away with altogether, for the wne-of-danger or in-course-of-employment tests 
should be sufficient to protect the employer from being treat!!d as an absolute insurer. 
